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Cleary: Litigating Incest Torts

COMMENT
LITIGATING INCEST TORTS UNDER
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES
I. INTRODUCTION

Incestuous child abuse is a problem of alarming proportions.
A recent study involving 930 women from California's Bay Area
indicated that sixteen per cent of the women who participated
(one out of six) had been sexually abused by a relative before
the age of eighteen. 1
Many women 2 who have been the victims of incestuous
abuse are bringing civil actions for damages against their abusers. 3 Such litigation can be an important source of redress for
these women; it can both empower the victim and force the
abuser to take responsibility for his actions.· In some cases these
tort claims are being tendered to the alleged tortfeasors' homeowner's insurance carrier for defense and indemnity under the
liability coverage provisions. II No California appellate court has
1. D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 10
(1986).
2. See generally D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1984). While there are men
who are victims of incestuous abuse as well, most of the information available is about
father-daughter incest and by far the great majority of victims are women. It is estimated that up to 97% of the incestuous assault cases involve a male perpetrator. S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST 5 (1978). See also D. FINKELHOR,
SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 75 (1979), in which the author reports that almost all
sexual abusers are men.
3. See, e.g., Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 609, 609-10 (1983).
4. See, e.g., J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 169 (1981). The author notes that
the conviction of an incest offender through the criminal justice system generally has a
positive effect on the victim and the incestuous family. See also, Tort Remedies, supra
note 3, at 617 n. 55 (reporting a telephone interview with S. BUTLER, author, CONSPIRACY
OF SILENCE, in which the benefits of a civil proceeding are discussed).
5. None of these cases has reached the appellate court level in California, but there
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addressed the issue of whether insurers are liable for coverage of
incest torts under homeowner's policies. However, some cases
have settled at the trial court level with the insurer paying part
of the settlement.8 This Comment will address insurers' liability
for incest torts under standard homeowner's insurance policies.
It primarily will examine potential liability in light of the intentional act and household exclusions which are typically contained in homeowner's policies.
II. BACKGROUND
The tort based on incestuous abuse is relatively new. The
unique characteristics of incesF present significant challenges
for victims seeking legal redress.
Women who choose to pursue legal action face two major
obstacles. One is the possibility of a time-bar based on the statute of limitations;8 another is the liability issue with respect to
any homeowner's insurance contracts held by the alleged abuser.
Both can best be understood by examining the effects of incest
on the victim and the characteristics of the perpetrator.
are some trial court cases where an alleged incestuous abuse offender is being sued under
his homeowner's policy. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Graff, No. 283832 (Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa filed March 14, 1986). There are a number of out of state cases which have reached the appellate court level. See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984); Rodriquez v. Williams, 107
Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Orman v. Orman, No. 266051 (Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa filed Nov. 20, 1984); Hertz v. Symmons, No. 257623 (Superior Court of
California, County of Contra Costa filed Mar. 23, 1984); Katz v. Birnberg, No. 324334
(Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento filed Nov. 29, 1984).
7. This Comment adopts the broad definition of incestuous assault proposed by S.
BUTLER, supra note 2, at 4-5: "any manual, oral or genital sexual contact or other explicit
sexual behavior that an adult family member imposes on a child, who is unable to alter
or understand the adult's behavior because of his or her powerlessness in the family and
early stage of psychological development." Assault under this definition is not limited to
sexual intercourse but includes "any sexual activity or experience imposed on a child
which results in emotional, physical or sexual trauma." Id. at 5.
8. See Comment, supra note 3, at 628-30 (arguing that victims of incestuous abuse
should be permitted to plead the delayed discovery exception to the statute of limitations for personal injuries). See also, Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute
of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 191 (1985); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving
the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 189 (1984).
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CHARACTERISTICS
PROBLEMS

OF

INCEST

THAT

LEAD

TO

TIME-BAR

The incest victim may experience profound psychological
problems. 9 In childhood these problems may be expressed as
anxiety, hostility, low self-esteem and feelings of guilt, shame
and inferiority.lo Adult women often find themselves unable to
form intimate relationships; they can suffer extreme isolation,
sexual dysfunction and deep mistrust of men.l1 They frequently
suffer from addictions to drugs or alcohol. 12 These injuries may
or may not ever be linked to the abuse that caused them because
of a "massive repression"13 that often occurs in victims. 14 It is
this "massive repression" of the memories of the incestuous
abuse that causes statute of limitations problems. Commonly the
victim of incestuous abuse does not recognize the harmful effects
of the abuse until well after it has stopped. 111 In particular, children who suffered violent abuse or abuse in the very early childhood years may not even begin to remember the trauma they
suffered until well into adulthood. IS This process of discovering
the harm may take a number of years.u
Once the injuries have been discovered, it often takes additional time, with the aid of professional psychological intervention, for the victim to transfer blame from herself to the perpetrator.lS Because of the characteristic lengthy discovery process
such women go through, it is very rare that an action can be
brought within one year 19 of the date of the injury, the tradi9. See, e.g., D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN 386 (1986); S. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 5; J. HERMAN, supra note 4, at 29; D.
FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 188-99 (1984).
10. See, e.g., J. HERMAN, supra note 4, at 30.
11. Id. at 31.
12. Id. at 99.
13. See, e.g., D. RUSSELL, supra note I, at 34, 246.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 246.
18. See D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 214 (1979).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) imposes a one year limitation
for commencing actions that involve "[l]ibel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction, injury or death from wrongful act or neglect, forged or raised checks,
injury to animals by feeder or veterinarian." Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 352(a)(l) (West
1982 & Supp. 1988), the statute of limitations is tolled until a person entitled to bring
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tional tort standard.
B.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INCESTUOUS FAMILIES

Any analysis of the insurance liability issues involved in
civil actions based on incestuous abuse should take into consideration the characteristics of the incestuous family.
Very little is known about the perpetrators in incestuous
abuse cases. 20 Most of the information available about incestuous family systems is contained in studies of father-daughter incest. 21 Little information is available about incestuous abuse involving brothers, uncles or grandfathers. 22
One researcher has suggested that incest occurs when certain preconditions are met. 23 First, the father's relationship with
his wife has deteriorated to the point where he begins to take a
sexual interest in his daughter whom he can manipulate to fulfill
his sexual and emotional needs.24 Second, the father's natural
inhibitions against incest might be overcome by a setback in his
career or, frequently, by alcohol.21i He tells himself that he really
loves his daughter and that no great harm will result from his
sexual attention to her.28 Additionally, the wife/mother does not
provide appropriate protective support for her daughter, but
rather is absent physically or emotionally.27 Finally, the daughter's resistance to her father is not strong because she trusts
him.28 She likes the attention and affection she is getting even if
she hates what he is doing to her.DB She may keep silent about
the abuse because she fears that the family will fall apart if she
speaks.30 Descriptions of the perpetrator range from that of a
such an action reaches the age of majority.
20. D. FINKELHOR, supra note 9, at 52.
21. Id. at 226.
22. Id. at 62, 227.
23. Id. at 63.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id.
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moralistic, authoritarian figure 31 to that of a timid and unassertive person with poor social skills. 32

III. CIVIL ACTIONS BASED ON INCESTUOUS ABUSE
A. THE CAUSES OF ACTION
Practitioners representing incest victims may take a 'shotgun' approach in the complaint for damages, alleging all possible
causes of action. A typical complaint might include the intentional torts of assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as negligence and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 33 Some attorneys may add a cause of action
against the victim's mother for negligent supervision. It may be
alleged that the mother failed to provide protection or support
for the victim of incest, even though she was fully aware of the
facts. 34

B. TIME-BAR BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Much attention in the area of tort claims based on incestuous abuse has focused on the problems presented by delayed
discovery of both the injury and its cause.3~ Plaintiffs may rely
on the argument that the one year statute of limitations should
not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the relationship between the incestuous acts and her injuries. 36 This
'delayed discovery' argument is premised on the latent and often
undiscoverable nature of incest injuries. 37 California recently en31. Id. at 43.
32.Id.
33. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Bechtel, No. 303518 (Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa tiled July 16, 1987).
34. See generally J. HERMAN, supra note 4. The author cautions, however, that "no
degree of maternal absence or neglect constitutes an excuse for paternal incest, unless
one accepts the idea that fathers are entitled to female services within their families, no
matter what the circumstances." Id. at 49.
35. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3; Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the
Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-term Damages, 25 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 191 (1985); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 189 (1984).
36. See Comment, supra note 3, at 628-31; see also Comment, California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 340.5: The Discovery Rule Codified? 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 759 (1983)
(providing a thorough history of the delayed discovery rule in California).
37. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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acted legislation to extend the statute of limitations for tort
claims based on incestuous abuse to three years. as There
promises to be continued litigation and definition of the law in
this area.
One California court recently held that an incest victim
could not take advantage of the delayed discovery doctrine if she
had "discovered all of the facts essential to the cause of action"
at the time the abuse occurred. as In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the sexual assaults were committed against her will,
caused her great fear and that she had acceded to the defendant's acts because she felt that he intended to carry out his
threats of harm.40 The court stated that "[t]he immediate harm
caused by the alleged assaults gave [her] a right to sue at that
time."u Thus, it sustained a demurrer to the complaint which
was based on the statute of limitations. n
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) reads as follows:
(a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years,
fornication, sodomy, oral copulation, or penetration of genital
or anal openings of another with a foreign object, in which this
conduct is alleged to have occurred between a household or
family member and a child where the act upon which the action is based occurred before the plaintiff attained the age of
18 years, the time for commencement of the action shall be
three years.
(b) "Injury or illness" as used in this section includes psychological injury or illness, whether or not accompanied by
physical injury or illness.
(c) "Household or family member" as used in this section
includes a parent, stepparent, former stepparent, sibling, stepsibling, or any other person who regularly resided in the
household at the time of the act, or who six months prior to
the act regularly resided in the household.
(d) Nothing in this bill is intended to preclude the courts
from applying delayed discovery exceptions to the accrual of a
cause of action for sexual molestation of a minor.
(e) This section shall apply to both of the following:
(1) Any action commenced on or after January I, 1987,
including any action which would be barred by application of
the period of limitation applicable prior to January I, 1987.
(2) Any action commenced prior to January I, 1987, and
pending on January I, 1987.
39. DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d lOll, 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (1987).
40. [d. at 1015, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
41. [d. at 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
42. [d. A petition for review of the decision was denied by the California Supreme
Court on March 11, 1988.
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INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES

Mortgage holders generally require homeowners to carry insurance against loss,.8 The typical homeowner's policy is a 'package' of risk coverages which includes "liability coverage for the
insureds' liability arising out of the covered premises."" Under
this liability coverage a policy holder is insured against any "occurrence", generally defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions."4o
Insurers will defend the insured and pay for damages if a
claim is made against an insured for bodily injury and property
damage under the liability coverage of a policy"s However, such
coverage usually excludes bodily injury or property damage
"which is expected or intended by the insured."" Further, a policy typically includes all relative residents of the household as
'insureds' under the policy'8 and excludes medical coverage for
injuries to those household members,.e
This examination of insurance coverage for incest torts will
43. See 2 R.C. MAXWELL, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 380.102[1],
at 380-65 (May 1987)(noting that "[i]f a property owner has a mortgage or deed of trust
on the property, the lender's approval of the [homeowner's] policy will probably be
required").
44. 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 1:61, at 152
(rev. ed. 1984).
45. 11 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 20
§ 44:285, at 437 (rev. ed. 1984).
46. See 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 1:61, at 152. Typical language of such a
policy reads:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured
for damages because of bodily injury or property damage
to which this coverage applies, we will:
a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for
which the insured is legally liable; and
b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our
choice. We may make any investigation and settie any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation
to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay
for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our
limit of liability.
Id. at § 1:61, at 178.
47. Id. at § 1:61, at 164.
48. Id. at § 1:61, at 153.
49. Id. at § 1:61, at 164.
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focus on the exclusion for acts which are expected or intended
by the insured and the exclusion for household members.

B.

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIONS ON INCEST TORT CLAIMS

When negligence is alleged in an incest tort claim the door
opens to the possibility of coverage under the defendant's homeowner's insurance policy.60 Insurers are likely to claim the insured is not covered because of the exclusion for intentional acts
and/or the exclusion for injuries to household members.
Procedurally, insurers may dispute their duty to defend a
claim in two different ways. An insurer may bring a motion for
declaratory relief against the insured and the injured party to
have the court declare whether the insurer is obligated to defend
a suit against its insured and whether it will be liable for any
judgment. 61 If the court finds that the insurer is not liable for
coverage of the claim, the insurer will be relieved of any further
duty to defend the action. 62 The critical consideration here is
50. See 11 G. COUCH, supra note 45, § 44:285, at 437. The author notes that "contemporary liability policies generally provide coverage on an occurrence basis" and
"highly probable or intentionally caused damage" is generally excluded from the definition of an "occurrence".
51. 18 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 74:117, at 624; § 74:150, at 664
(rev. ed. 1983). In California, a declaratory relief action is authorized by CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1060 (West 1980), which reads as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will or other written
instrument, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration
of his rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to,
in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of
the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action in the superior court
or file a cross-complaint in a pending action in the superior,
municipal or justice court for a declaration of his rights and
duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under such instrument
or contract. He may ask for a declaration of rights or duties,
either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a
binding declaration of such rights or duties, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect,
and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.
Such declaration may be had before there has been any breach
of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.
52. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1060 which authorizes a court to make a "binding
declaration" of rights and duties.
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that if the claim is no longer covered under an insurance policy,
the likelihood of a recovery for damages may be reduced, depending on the personal resources of the defendant.
In the alternative, an insurer may choose to defend the action until a judgment is rendered and then bring an action for
declaratory relief or wait for the insured to sue for satisfaction of
the judgment.!!S Again, if the insurer succeeds, the plaintiff
would have to rely on the defendant's personal resources for a
satisfaction of the judgment.
C.

INSURANCE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Courts generally apply the same principles to construe insurance contracts as govern the interpretation of all contracts.!!4
These principles may offer plaintiffs the greatest hope of successfully arguing for coverage of injuries arising from incestuous
abuse.
Clauses which limit liability and exclude coverage are
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.!!!! Any ambiguities in the terms of a contract are construed
against the insurer.!!6 While a court will not force a construction
which burdens an insurer with a risk it did not assume,!!7 it will,
when possible, interpret a policy in a way that protects the in53. See 18 G. COUCH, supra note 51, at § 74:149, at 661 (commenting that an action
for declaratory relief is available to a liability insurer to determine its liability to one
obtaining a judgment against the insured).
54. See 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 15:1, at 114 (rev. ed. 1983).
55. Id. at § 15:48, at 283. See, e.g., Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title
Ins. Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746,83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) ("[P]rovisions relating to
exclusions or exceptions from the performance of the basic, underlying obligation are
construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured." Id. at 569,
463 P.2d at 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 398).
56. Id. at § 15:14, at 158-59. See, e.g., Harabedian v. Zurich Ins. Co. 218 Cal. App.
2d 702, 707, 32 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1963) (quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437-38, 296 P.2d 801, 809):
If the insurer uses language that is uncertain any reasonable
doubt will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent
or fact of coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the
amount of liability, or the person or persons protected, the
language will be understood in its most inclusive sense for the
benefit of the insured.
57. Harabedian, 218 Cal. App. 2d at 707, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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sured.1i8 Additionally, the interpretation of the policy is a question of lawli9 and will not go before the jury unless its meaning is
dependent on disputed facts. 8o Any exceptions to the basic coverage offered by the policy must be clearly stated so that the
insured will have notice of their effect. 81
The classic statement of California's judicial approach to insurance contract interpretation may be found in Continental
Casualty Company v. Phoenix Construction Company:82
It is elementary in insurance law that any
ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is
to be resolved against the insurer. If semantically
permissible, the contract will be given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of securing indemnity to the insured for the losses to
which the insurance relates. If the insurer uses
language which is uncertain any reasonable doubt
will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to
extent or fact of coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the amount of liability, or the person or persons protected, the language will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the
benefit of the insured. s8
58. [d.
59. 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 20, at § 15:3, at 116 (rev. ed. 1984).
See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801
(1956); Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904
(1977).
60. 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 15:3, at 120.
61. See, e.g., Grey v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 262, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72,54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966).
62. 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
63. [d. at 438-39, 296 P.2d at 809-10 (citations omitted). See also 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 7401 et seq. (1979); 2 G. COUCH, supra note 59, at § 15:7,
at 341-47:
Many courts have said that a contract of insurance
couched in language chosen by the insurer is, if open to the
construction contended for by the insured, to be construed
most strongly, or strictly, against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the contention of the insured. Ambiguous or doubtful
language or terms, it is said, must be given the strongest interpretation against the insurer which they will reasonably bear,
or, conversely, that the meaning of the words used that is
most advantageous to the assured should be adopted, for the
courts are not inclined to permit the insurer to take advantage
of any ambiguity, especially when the plaintiff's cause is meri-
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These settled principles must be applied in an analysis of
any insurance contract coverage question. Language is critical to
the court's interpretation of an exclusionary clause.

D.

OCCURRENCE LIABILITY

A threshold question when analyzing insurance coverage of
an injury is whether the acts which led to the injury constitute
an "occurrence" under a given liability policy.s. Historically, insurers sought to narrow the scope of coverage under liability policies to loss by "accidental means".S6 But courts have recognized
that such an interpretation would afford very little coverage and
would frustrate the reasonable expectations of the insureds. ss
Thus, they have broadly defined coverage to include occurrences
which are unforeseen, unexpected, and out of the ordinary, either because they happened at all or because of the extent of the
resultant damage. s7 An accident under this broader construction
can be either a distinct event or a more slowly evolving process
or exposureS8 and may include the unintended consequences of
intentional acts. S9 One commentator has suggested that this liberal construction is justified by the public interest in carrying
out the reasonable expectations of the insured. 70
torious and the defense is technical. A better statement is that
if an insurance contract is so drawn as to be equivocal, uncertain, or ambiguous, and to require interpretation because
fairly susceptible of two or more different, but sensible and
reasonable constructions, the one will be adopted which, if
consistent with the objects of the insurance, is most favorable
to the insured.
64. See, e.g., 14 G. COUCH, supra note 45, § 44:285, at 437.
65. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT, § 5.4(e), at 302 (1971).
66. Id. at § 5.4(e), at 304. See also Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n,
295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946) (rejecting the distinction between accidental means
and accidental results and allowing coverage in a case where the insured died trying to
dig his car out of a snow-filled ditch). In Burr, a strict construction of the phrase "accidental means" would have denied coverage because the insured's exertions while shovelling snow were not accidental and could be inferred to have contributed to his death. See
R. KEETON, supra note 63, at 304 n.7.
67. R. KEETON, supra note 65, at 300. The author cites the 1966 Revision of the
Standardized Liability Policy language which defines "occurrence" as an "accident, including injurious exposure to conditions." He suggests that the language was intended to
broaden coverage, particularly with respect to a continuing condition as distinguished
from a sudden event.
68.Id.
69. 11 G. COUCH, supra note 45, at § 44:289, at 449.
70. R. KEETON, supra note 65, at § 5.4(e), at 304. The author states that:
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There is at least an indication that some courts would like
to throw back the clocks to that more restrictive time when construing policy coverage of sexual abuse cases. In one recent case,
Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Malcolm,71 a New
Hampshire court refused to accept the argument that sexual assault by an insured could be considered an "occurrence" for purposes of determining coverage under a homeowner's policy.72 In
Malcolm, the court had to interpret a policy which defined an
"occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions, which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury."73 The court acknowledged that the term "occurrence"
under the language of the policy was more inclusive than "accident",74 but insisted that an insured's intentional act could not
be an "occurrence" when it was so inherently injurious that it
could not be performed without causing the resulting injury.711
In Malcolm, the underlying civil action alleged repeated
sexual assaults by the defendent against an eleven-year-old boy
during one weekend. 76 The court found the alleged assaults inherently injurious, apparently because they fit into "the most se[Dlespite their theoretical basis of interpreting the manifested
intention of the contracting parties, the courts have, to serve a
public interest, imposed a very considerable judicial restriction
upon the freedom of contract. This restriction can be justified
on the grounds that literal enforcement of the provisions on
accidental means would afford such minimal coverage as to be
patently disproportionate to the premiums paid and that
there would be little occasion for buying insurance of such
narrow scope, thus providing only against a risk defined in a
bizarre way that would never be conceived by one stating his
insurance needs. These considerations support the conclusion
that literal enforcement would be inconsistent with reasonable
expectations of insureds.
Id.

71. 128 N.H. 521, 517 A.2d 800 (1986).
72. Id. See also Western Nat'l Assur. Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash. App. 816, 719 P.2d
954 (1986) (holding that an alleged negligent act of forcible anal intercourse was not a
covered "occurrence" or "accident" under a policy); Rodriquez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d
381,729 P.2d 627, 629 (1986) (noting that "[wlere this an "accidental occurrence" policy,
we would simply deny that coverage existed under the policy because the act of committing incest could not be described as an accidental occurrence". Id. at 384, 729 P.2d at
629).
73. Malcolm, 128 N.H. at 523, 517 A.2d at 802.
74.Id.
75.Id.
76. Id. at 522, 517 A.2d at 801.
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rious of sex offenses" under the state's criminal statutes." The
court concluded its analysis by noting that "[i]f the insured did
not intend to inflict the injury on the victim by his intentional
act, and the act was not so inherently injurious that the injury
was certain to follow from it, the act as a contributing cause of
injury would be regarded as accidental and an "occurrence".78
In its analysis the Malcolm court seemed to abandon the
settled rules of contract interpretation and substitute tort law
concepts instead. 79 It imposed a foreseeability factor into the
definition of "accidental" under the policy.80 The court was careful however, to distinguish its holding from those in which the
language of the policy referred to the injury as being neither expected nor intended "from the standpoint of the insured".81 It is
unclear what the court would have ruled if such language, common to many policies, had been at issue.
The California courts have not considered the issue of
whether incestuous abuse may be an "occurrence" for purposes
of insurance coverage under a homeowner's policy. However, a
long line of authority suggests that the term "accidental" is
given a broad construction in California and that "any event
which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the
person acted upon or effected by the event"82 will be considered
an occurrence for purposes of liability insurance coverage. 8S
Courts have placed some limits on what may be considered
occurrences under liability policies; however, these exceptions
seem to be limited to cases where intentional torts are alleged in
the underlying complaint.8•
77. [d. at 525, 517 A.2d at 803.
78. [d.
79. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
80. Malcolm, 128 N.H. at 523, 517 A.2d at 802.
81. [d. at 526, 517 A.2d at 803.
82. Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 563, 334
P.2d 881, 884 (1959).
83. [d. See also Economy Lumber Co. of Oakland, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 157 Cal. App. 3d 641, 204 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1984).
84. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 226 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1986) (where the complaint alleged fraud and the court held that Royal Globe was
not obligated to defend its insured since all of the evidence indicated that the builder
intentionally made a promise that he did not intend to keep); Commercial Union Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 242 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1987) (where the complaint
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Litigators should be cautioned that allegations of intentional torts in an incestuous abuse case may lead to insurance
coverage problems in this area.

E.

INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION

Most liability insurance contracts include exclusions for intentional acts committed by the insured. 811 It is important to
note that courts employ the rules of contract construction, not
the principles of substantive law, to interpret the meaning of'intent' when trying to determine whether the harm inflicted is
covered by the defendant's policy.8s Thus, an injury might be
covered under an insurance policy where an insured either intends to inflict a minor impact or has no intention of harm at all
and the resultant harm is much greater than what was intended. 87 Under tort law principles however, the tortfeasor
would have to "take the frail plaintiff" as found for purposes of
liability.88
Courts take one of three approaches in trying to decide
whether an act committed by the insured was the kind of act
excluded by the insuranc~ policy.89 Many courts apply an objective standard of analysis, asking what results an ordinary person
would expect from the act at issue without regard to subjective
intent. 90 Under this standard, once the injurious act is found to
be intentional, there is no coverage if objectively the injury
could be expected by the act. 91 The standard is defended by
such courts on the ground that public policy demands that an
alleged wrongful termination and the court held that such an intentional act was not
accidental as a matter of law).
.
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
86. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT, § 5.4(b) (1971).
87.Id.
88.Id.
89. Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance
Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 ALR 4th 957,
973 (1984).
90. See, e.g., Mutual Servo Cas. Ins. CO. V. McGehee, 711 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1985)
("Where, as here, an assailant aggressively and intentionally strikes another in the face,
it is irrelevant for the purposes of this insurance exclusion that the assailant causes an
injury different in character or magnitude from the harm he subjectively intended.");
Unigard Mut. Ins. CO. V. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 20 Wash. App. 261, 579 P.2d 1015
(1978).
91. McGehee, 711 P.2d at 828.
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insured should not be indemnified against his or her own wrongdoing. 92 However, other courts attack the objective standard on
the basis that "virtually no intentional act would ever be covered"B3 using such an analysis. B4
Other jurisdictions use a subjective test: Did the insured intend or expect the action taken to result in injury?BII In implementing this standard courts rely on the plain language of the
policy.B8 In other words, if the insured did not subjectively expect or intend the injury, the intentional act exclusion is inapplicable, regardless of the reasonableness of the expectation or
intention. B7
The New Hampshire Supreme Court employed a subjective
test to interpret an insurance policy where the plaintiff was alleging an incest tort in MacKinnon v. Hanover Insurance Company.B8 In MacKinnon, the defendant stepfather allegedly sexually abused his six-year-old stepdaughter. BB He brought an
action for declaratory relief against his insurance carrier to determine coverage under his homeowner's policy.loO The complaint stated causes of action for battery and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. lol The policy excluded "bodily injury ...
which is expected or intended by the insured. "102 The court held
that the exclusion referred to the defendant's actual expectation
or intention. l03
92. [d. See also 7A ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4492:01, at 21 (1979).
93. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986). The
court noted that U[i)ntentional acts which result in injury generally can be expected to
result in injury." [d. at 386, 729 P.2d at 630.
94. [d.
95. See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co. 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984);
Alabama Farm Bur. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So.2d 921 (Ala. 1984) (wrongful
death case in which the subjective intent of the policyholder was considered to be
crucial).
96. MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167. Here, the court stated that
"[t)here is no indication that 'bodily injury ... expected or intended by the insured'
refers to anything other than actual expectation or intention, as to the bodily injury, in
the mind of the insured at the time he took the action allegedly resulting in injury." [d.
97. [d.
98. 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984).
99. [d. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167.
100. [d.
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
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The meaning of the language is plain and the
common meaning of the language governs. There
is no indication that 'bodily injury ... expected or
intended by the insured' refers to anything other
than actual expectation or intention, as to the
bodily injury, in the mind of the insured at the
time he took the action allegedly resulting in
injury.lo4

The court remanded the action back to the Superior Court to
determine the defendant's intent as to the claimed injuries. 1011
Finally, there are recent cases in which the court infers intent as a matter of law when sexual abuse is involved. l06 In these
decisions an intent to harm is inferred even in the absence of
subjective intent where the court decides that harm is inherent
in the nature of the act.107 Courts sometimes justify this inference on the basis that the legislature has made the act a
crime. lOB
In Rodriquez v. Williams/os the Supreme Court of Washington held that an insured intended harm as a matter of law
when he committed incest and thus there was no coverage under
his homeowner's policy because of the intentional act exclusionary clause. llo The actual subjective intent of the insured was irrelevant in this court's analysis, III as was the fact that the scope
of the injuries might have been much greater or different from
injuries which objectively might have been expected.l12
The MacKinnon court rejected the approach which infers
intent as a matter of law principally because it violates "the
usual rules of construction in cases of insurance contracts by in104. [d. (citations omitted).
105. [d. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1169.
106. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351, 694 P.2d 181 (1984); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Judith G., 379
N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1986); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982).
107. Rodriguez, 107 Wash. 2d at 387, 729 P.2d at 630.
108. [d.
109. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986).
110. [d.
111. [d. at 387, 729 P.2d at 630.
112. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/3

16

Cleary: Litigating Incest Torts

LITIGATING INCEST TORTS

1988]

555

jecting concepts of substantive tort law into the process."ll3 According to that court, the insurer could have expressly excluded
coverage of acts that were certain to produce injury in the language of its policy, but had not done SO.114
In Zordan By and Through Zordan u. Page,tll'> a Florida
court followed the MacKinnon court's reasoning, holding that
coverage would not be excluded under an intentional injury exclusion clause where the insured allegedly sexually fondled a
child. lIS The court held that the exclusionary clause was inapplicable unless the insured acted with specific intent to cause injuries.117 The court rejected the reasoning of many jurisdictions
which hold that intent may be inferred as a matter of law in
cases involving sexual abuse. ll8 It acknowledged that while "one
may have a first, visceral reaction which is strongly adverse to
any conclusion that a person who engages in sexual fondling of.a
child may be covered by liability insurance,"ll8 it would fail in
its judicial responsibility if it allowed such a reaction to govern
its decision.l2O The Zordan court accepted the MacKinnon
court's argument that intent should not be inferred where the
insurer could have expressly provided for an exclusion.l21 It additionally argued that "doubtful insurance coverage questions
must be resolved against the insurer."122
This reasoning was reiterated by an Alabama federal district court in State Auto Mutual Insurance Company u. McIntyre. 123 That court found insurance coverage for injuries resulting from the 'non-violent' sexual abuse of his granddaughter by
the insured, notwithstanding an exclusion for injuries intended
or expected by the insured.124 The McIntyre court noted that
"the presumption in tort and criminal law that a person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his or her intentional
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1168.
[d.
500 So.2d 608 (Fla.App.2 Dist. 1986).
[d.
[d. at 609-10.
[d. at 611.
[d. at 613.
[d.
[d.
[d.
652 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
[d. at 1177.
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acts has no application to the interpretation of the terms. . . .
The policy terms 'expected or intended injury' cannot be
equated with 'foreseeable injury'."l25
According to the McIntyre court, the key to reaching a correct legal result was the recognition and application of the
state's "settled principles governing the construction and application of insurance policies. "126 It used a "purely subjective
standard"127 and placed the burden squarely on the insurer to
establish that the insured expected or intended the injury.128
Many states have passed statutory restrictions on the use of
exclusionary clauses by an insurer. 1Z9 Under California's statute,
an act by the insured must be 'wilful' in order for the insurer to
take advantage of the exclusion. ISO The insurer must establish
that its insured committed the wrongful acts with a specific intent to cause harm or a "preconceived design to inflict injury."181
Under this standard, the insured's subjective intent, rather than
the physical nature of the acts committed, determines whether
the insured's policy covers the act at issue. ls2 Thus, California
courts support the view that the insured must have intended the
act as well as some kind of bodily injury in order for the intentional injury exclusion clause to apply. This is particularly
promising for women bringing suit for incest torts since studies
tell us that the incest tortfeasor does not generally intend to
harm his victim. ISS
There has not been an appellate court decision in California
dealing with the exclusion of intentional acts from coverage
under homeowner's policies in the specific context of incest.
125. Id. at 1187.
126. Id. at 1194.
127. Id. at 1187.
128. Id. at 1195.
129. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988); "An insurer is not
liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the
negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others."
130. Id.
131. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 887, 587 P.2d 1098, 1110, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 297 (1978).
132. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 849-50, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 823, 827-28 (1984); Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorist Ins. Co.,
91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 695-98, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350-52 (1979).
133. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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However, California decisions interpreting the intentional act
exclusion clauses suggest that courts use a subjective approach,
and construe the clauses strictly against the insurer .1S.
The seminal California decision in this area, Clemmer v.
Hartford Insurance Company/Sli was an action by holders of a
wrongful death judgment against an insured who had been convicted of second degree murder for the decedent's death. lSG The
trial court held that the heirs could litigate the issue of the insured's mental state at the time of the shooting even though he
had been found guilty in a criminal proceeding. ls7 The jury
found that the insured had not had the intent required to exclude this act from coverage, and thus, the insurance company
was liable for damages to the heirs.13G The California Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had properly imposed upon the insurer the burden of proving that the insured
had committed a wilful act. l39 The court noted that there was a
"clear line of authority"140 in California to the effect that an act
which is intentional or wilful under "traditional tort principles"Hl must be done with a "preconceived design to inflict injury"H2 in order to exonerate an insurer from providing
coverage. l•S
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Overton/·· a California appellate court rejected the argument that an insured's criminal conviction for battery established his mental state for purposes of
insurance coverage. The plaintiff in the underlying action al134. See, e.g., Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285 (1978); Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 91 Cal.
App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979); Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642
P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982) (fact that an insured might be liable for punitive
damages for conduct evidencing a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others
held not to preclude his insurer's obligation to indemnify him for compensatory damages
if his conduct did not rise to the level of an intent to cause injury); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984).
135. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 887, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984).
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leged that the insured had struck him in the face. UII The court
was unwilling to infer intent for purposes of insurance coverage
because a judgment of conviction for battery does not necessarily determine intent to injure. 148 In California, the wilfulness element of the crime of battery can be satisfied by showing an
intent to do the act, it does not require an intent to injure. U7
According to the court, an insurer in California must show a specific intent to injure in order to take advantage of an intentional
act exclusionary clause. U8
In Congregation of Rodef Sholom of Marin v. American
Motorists Insurance Company,t49 a sixteen-year-old boy set fire
to a wastebasket in his classroom at the Rodef Sholom synagogue causing property damage. lIIo The synagogue sued the boy
and his parents for damages and got a judgment. 1I1l The synagogue then brought an action seeking coverage under the family's homeowner's policy.11l2 The court held that there was coverage under the policy.lIIS It noted that "it is the intent to cause
damage beyond the point of origin of the fire which is the intent
that makes the exclusion applicable. "1114 It rejected the notion
that an insurer would be exonerated from coverage where an act
is intentional within the meaning of "traditional tort principles" 11111 without a finding of a "preconceived design to inflict injury".11l8 The court stated that "the public's strong interest in
the compensation of victims reinforces the well settled principle
that such exclusionary clauses should be interpreted as narrowly
as possible. "m
145. [d. at 847, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
146. [d. at 849, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988) reads:

The word 'willfully', when applied to the intent with
which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or
willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred
to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure
another, or to acquire any advantage.
148. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
149. 91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 693, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
at 698, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
at 695, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
at 696, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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The one California appellate court decision which has considered insurance coverage in the context of sexual molestation
stands in stark contrast to the above noted line of decisions. In
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kim W.,lIiB an insurer filed a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that a homeowner's policy issued to the insured provided no coverage for sexual assaults by the insured against the minor plaintiff in the
underlying action. ui9 The homeowners' policy at issue contained
a clause excluding coverage for "bodily injury or property damage intentionally caused by an insured person."160 When he answered the complaint, the insured admitted that he had violated
the penal code statute prohibiting sexual and physical abuse of a
minor. I61 The court concluded that a violation of the penal code
section constituted a wilful act as a matter of law I62 and affirmed
a grant of summary judgment for the insurer. I63
Kim W. portends to be the decision that insurance companies will rely upon when the issue of intentional act exclusions in
the context of incest reaches California's high court. It is important to note however, that the court in Kim W. did not hold that
intent can be inferred as a matter of law in sexual abuse cases.
Rather, it reasoned that the wording of the penal code statute
indicated the legislature's determination that at least some harm
was inherent in such conduct. I6• The court therefore concluded
that an intent to cause some harm could be inferred as a matter
of law from the insured's admission that he violated the statute. I611 In Florida, the Zordan court distinguished its holding
from that in Kim W., noting that the public policy applicable to
criminal law is not always automatically applicable in a civil
action. 166

To infer intent as a matter of law when there is an admission to acts of sexual abuse would conflict squarely with the long
line of California cases holding that an insured's state of mind or
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984).
[d.
[d. at 329, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
[d. at 330, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE § 288).
[d. at 333, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
[d. at 335, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
[d. at 332, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
[d.
Zordan ex rei. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 608, 610 (Fla. App. 2 Diat. 1986).
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intent, rather than the nature of his acts, determines coverage. 167
This subjective standard relies on a very careful analysis of the
facts on a case by case basis.
Further, to infer intent as a matter of law in sexual abuse
cases would be contrary to traditional principles of insurance
contract interpretation. 16B A principled interpretation of a policy
which excludes coverage of "bodily injury ... expected or intended by the insured" begins by looking at the "common meaning of the language."169 The MacKinnon court had no trouble
finding that the language referred to "actual expectation or
intention. "170
Another argument used by opponents of the subjective standard is that public policy dictates that an insured should not be
indemnified against liability for the consequences of his own
wrongdoing,l7l But, as the Rode! Sholom court found, public
policy also dictates that victims should be compensated. 172
While the facts in many instances of incestuous abuse might
give rise to an inference of intent, the intent to injure is not
there in most instances.173 One of the reasons that this kind of
sexual abuse is so psychologically harmful to a child is because it
is not done with an intent to injure. 17• If the intent to injure was
present, it would be easier for a child to identify the behavior as
wrong and to resist it.l7II Most often however, incestuous abuse is
combined with and confused with parentallove. 176 When the insured does not intend to injure the child, insurance coverage
should be available for any resultant injuries if the language of a
policy allows coverage under traditional principles of insurance
contract construction. 177
167. See, e.g., supra notes 133-60 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
169. See MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167, citing Baker v. McCarthy,
122 N.H. 171, 175, 443 A.2d 138, 140 (1982).
170. MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167.
171. [d. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1168.
172. See Roder Sholom, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
173. See note 24 and accompanying text.
174. [d.
175. [d.
176. [d.
177. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
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HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION/TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Homeowners' insurance policies generally do not afford coverage of injuries to residents of the household. 178 However,
courts generally will interpret policy terminology to extend coverage whenever possible. 179 The use of a broad or narrow construction will depend on which interpretation of the facts, if reasonable, will provide coverage. 180
A well-settled general rule places the time of an occurrence
within the meaning of a liability policy to be the time when the
damage occurred, not the time that the wrongful act was committed. 18l The manifestation of injury from incestuous abuse
178. A typical household exclusion in a homeowner's policy reads:
We will pay the necessary medical expenses incurred or medically ascertained within three years from the date of an accident causing bodily injury. Medical expenses means reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance,
hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral
services. This coverage does not apply to you or regular residents of your household other than residence employees.
See 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 1:61, at 164.
179. Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc, 151 Cal. App. 2d 775, 312 P.2d 401 (1957)
"[W)e start the problem of interpretation with the rule that the policy must be construed so as to give James the benefit of any reasonable interpretation that may bring
him within its coverage." [d. at 781, 312 P.2d at 404.
180. See, e.g., Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Home Indem. Co. 241 Cal. App. 2d 303,
308, 50 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 9 Cal. App. 3d 898, 902,
88 Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (1970). See also Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Davis, 90 Cal. App.
3d 782, 784-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1979). In Davis, the court relied on CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 244, which deals with the interpretation of residence. That code section reads in
pertinent part:
In determining the place of residency the following
rules shall be observed:
(b) there can only be one residence;
(c) a residence cannot be lost until another is
gained;
(d) the residence of the parent with whom an
unmarried minor child maintains his or her
place of abode is the residence of such
unmarried minor child.
(e) the residence of an unmarried minor who has
a parent living cannot be changed by his or
her own act;
(f) the residence can be changed only by the union
of act and intent.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 244 (West 1980).
181. Schrillo v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (formerly Highlands Ins. Co v. Schrillo
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typically involves a continuous and progressive process that extends over many years. 182 In California, some courts have taken
the position that, where the facts reveal a progressive development and accumulation of injuries over time, the time of "occurrence" triggering coverage is the whole period of time during
which the injuries thus progressively develop and occur.183 This
"continuing injury" doctrine is particularly appropriate for judicial analysis of insurance coverage of incest torts under a household exclusion clause.
It is important however, not to confuse the "continuing injury" doctrine with the "delayed discovery" doctrine. 184 Courts
have held that the delayed discovery of an injury does not affect
the time of the occurrence of an injury for purposes of determining the applicable policy period for coverage. 1811 Thus, a claimant
must be able to allege a continuing and progressive injury in order to take advantage of the doctrine; delayed discovery is insufficient in and of itself.

The continuing injury doctrine is best exemplified by the
California appellate court decision in California Union Ins. Co.
v. Landmark Ins. CO .. 18S That case involved a dispute between
successive insurers as to which should indemnify the insured for
property damages that occurred over a two-year period. 187 According to the undisputed facts, improper subgrading during
construction of a swimming pool caused cracks to develop in the
pool shell leading to underground leakage from the pool which
resulted in soil slippage. 188 Ultimately, certain structures on the
property were damaged. 189 Landmark was the insurer during the
initial construction and occurrence of property damage. 19o It
paid for repairs without knowing about the underlying causes,
Co.), 181 Cal. App. 3d 766, 773, 226 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1986).
182. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
183. See California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 47478, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468-71 (1983).
184. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Tijsseling v. General Ace., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d
623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976).
186. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
187. 1d.
188. 1d. at 467, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
189. Id.
190. 1d.
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which continued to cause damage over time. 19l Subsequently,
during California Union's policy term, new property damage occurred and the underlying causes were discovered. 192
Landmark argued that it should not have to pay for any of
the property damage that occurred after its policy term had ended. 19s California Union responded that, because the injuries
which occurred during its policy term were a continuation of injuries that had actually incepted and been caused during
Landmark's term, all the damages should be Landmark's responsibility.19. Paradoxically, both sides argued that the general
rule fixing the time of "occurrence" as the time of actual injury
or damage supported its position.1 911
The court concluded that this general principle was inapposite given the facts before it. 19G It found that during the entire
period of time at issue "the damage was accumulating and becoming progressively more severe."197 The court resolved the situation by regarding the entire time period during which the injuries progressively developed as the time of "occurrence"
triggering coverage, thus holding each insurer jointly and severally liable for all of the damages. 198
The court in California Union relied on two products liability cases involving the manufacturers of asbestos products, Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc.199 and Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North
America. 20o In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that cumulative diseases such as asbestosis are different
from ordinary accidents or diseases and thus must be treated
differently by the judiciary.20l It noted that the theory of liability in asbestos cases is that the continuous exposure to asbestos
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 468, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 470, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
Id. at 473-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467-71.
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1219.
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particles allowed asbestosis to progress to the point where it
caused injury or death.202 The court reasoned that "the contracting parties would expect coverage to parallel the theory of
liability."208 In holding that insurers would be liable for coverage
of asbestos claims from the time of exposure to the disease, to
and including its manifestation, the court stated that it was
bound to "broadly construe the policies to promote coverage."204
In Keene, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held that coverage of asbestosis was not limited to the time the
disease manifested itself, but was triggered by inhalation of asbestosis particles, the subsequent development of the disease
and its manifestation. 20G In so holding, the court noted its obligation to construe coverage under the policies with the objective
of giving effect to the policies' dominant purpose of indemnity.206 It acknowledged that the particular terms of the insurance policies were ambiguous as applied to such a slowly evolving disease, but that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the
insured. 207
The Keene court's "multiple trigger" theory in which the
injury is understood to have "occurred" at exposure, manifestation, and the period of latency was recently adopted by a California court in asbestos related litigation. 208 The California Superior Court tentatively ruled that because asbestosis has been
demonstrated to be a disease in which bodily injury occurs in a
continuing and progressive manner over time, the time period of
the occurrence of injury triggering coverage consists of the whole
time period during which the disease develops, beginning with
the time of exposure and continuing until death or a claim is
filed. 209
Analogies can easily be drawn between the asbestos cases,
202. [d.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 1219, 1223.
205. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1245.
206. [d. at 1041.
207. [d.
208. Asbestosis Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding
No. 1072 (Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco tentative ruling May 29,
1987).
209. [d. at 43-45.
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California Union, and many cases involving incestuous abuse
torts. An insured's wrongful conduct causes deep-seated and
hidden injuries to the victim which develop and multiply over
time, causing the progressive occurrence of many specific injuries. 21o Under the "continuing injury" theory the victim of an
incest tort may not be covered for the period of time she resides
in the insured's household, but would be covered for the time
after she moves out during which her injuries continue to develop and accumulate. Applying the reasoning of the California
Union court, all insurers from the inception of the injuries
throughout their progressive development would be jointly and
severally liable for liability coverage.

It must be recognized however, that the use of this continuing injury doctrine would preclude a claim of multiple occurrences based on incestuous abuse occurring over many years. A
claim of multiple occurrences could potentially result in a much
higher recovery, while reliance on a single occurrence limits recovery to the policy's "per occurrence" limits. 211

v.

CONCLUSION

Torts based on incestuous abuse present special problems to
the litigator because of the unique characteristics of incest. One
of the biggest problems is the tendency of some courts to infuse
substantive tort law into the interpretation of insurance contracts when coverage questions involve sexual abuse. Principles
of contract interpretation require courts to construe questionable coverage in favor of the insured. Under these principles, incest torts should be covered by homeowner's insurance policies
when the injury was neither expected nor intended by the insured, unless the insurer has expressly stated otherwise in the
language of the contract.
The injuries related to incestuous abuse develop very slowly
over time and in that way are similar to asbestosis. The "multiple trigger" analysis used by some courts when determining as210. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468
(holding that the continuing injury to the insured's property constituted one occurrence
for purposes of insurance coverage).
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bestosis insurance coverage issues is appropriate to use when analyzing coverage of incest torts as well. Such an analysis would
allow a victim of incestuous abuse who resided in the insured's
household during a portion of the evolution of the injury to
claim coverage of the injury for the period of time after she is no
longer a member of the household.
Christine Cleary*
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